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Abstract:  
In this paper, we measure the welfare effects of banning child labor in an economy with 
strong idiosyncratic shocks to employment. We then design two different policies: an 
unemployment insurance program and a universal basic income system. We show that 
they can often lead to an endogenous elimination of child labor. We work within a 
dynamic, general equilibrium model calibrated to South Africa in the 1990s. 
 
Keywords: Child Labor, Idiosyncratic shocks, Unemployment insurance, Universal 
basic income, Heterogeneous agents, Child labor ban 
 
JEL Classification: E20, D58, J65 
 
Introduction
In the United States, the average duration of unemployment during much of the 1990s
was about twelve weeks. Unemployment rates remained in the neighborhood of 6%, the
probability to stay employed was close to 1 and the probability to move out of unemployment
over a six-week period was one half. Those without job offers were temporarily offered
unemployment benefits which represented close to 35% of their previous wage (Pallage &
Zimmermann, 2005).
In some countries, like South Africa, being unemployed over the same period was a dif-
ferent experience. On average, it meant a very long period without work – in the order of 2
years according to Kingdon & Knight (2004b). The average unemployment rate ranged from
20% to 40% (Kingdon & Knight, 2004a), depending on the definition, and until 2001 there
was no generalized public support for the unemployed. Since credit was hardly available to
those without work (FinScope, 2004), there were essentially two ways to self-ensure against
employment shocks: one was to accumulate savings, the other was to rely on child labor
when adult work could not be found.
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents calibrated to
South Africa prior to the introduction of an unemployment insurance agency. We investigate
how child labor responds to idiosyncratic employment shocks in this model and whether an
appropriately chosen unemployment insurance [UI] would make child labor endogenously
vanish. We compare this result to an outright ban on child labor and to other economic
instruments such as a universal basic income.
Child labor is not a small phenomenon. The International Labor Organization (ILO)
estimates at 215 million the number of children working worldwide (ILO, 2010). Campaigns
against child labor have advocated bans (i.e. ILO, Conventions C138, C182), product boy-
cotts or threats to boycotts (US Senator Harkin’s bill), or trade sanctions against countries
tolerating the practice.1
Since the seminal work of Basu & Van (1998), child labor has generated a large body
1The effects of boycotts are analyzed in Basu & Zarghamee (2009), those of trade sanctions are addressed
in Jafarey & Lahiri (2002). These studies show that both product boycotts and trade sanctions may in fact
increase the incidence of child labor for reasonable scenarios.
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of theoretical work trying to understand why altruistic parents would choose to send their
children to work. Multiple causes have been highlighted going from poverty (Basu, 1999,
2000; Dessy, 2000; Jafarey & Lahiri, 2002; Dessy & Pallage, 2005) to social norms (Lo´pez-
Calva, 2002; Emerson & Souza, 2003) to market failures (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Dessy
& Pallage, 2001; Emerson & Knabb, 2007).
In this paper, we argue that child labor may serve as a natural insurance mechanism
against adverse employment shocks hitting the family. If such is the case, a ban on child
labor may have adverse welfare effects. If bans have been questioned in the literature (Doepke
& Zilibotti, 2005, 2009; Dessy & Pallage, 2005) as appropriate means to fight child labor,
our model allows us to measure the welfare effects they could have if they ended up in the
forced elimination of child labor.
Empirical studies have shown that child labor may indeed act as a buffer against household
income shocks in developing countries. For example, Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti (2006), using
household panel data of Tanzania, highlight the fact that transitory income shocks lead to
a significantly higher incidence of child labor. Guarcello, Mealli, & Rosati (2010) show that
in Guatemala both collective shocks and individual shocks increase the economic activities
of children. Using historical data for the United States in the XIXe century, Goldin (1979)
shows that the occurrence of adult unemployment raised the probability of their children
going to work.
In order to reduce child labor, more and more governments try to implement social pro-
grams, like the Bosla familia program in Brazil or the Oportunidades Program in Mexico.
But very few theoretical studies in the literature have compared the different instruments
that could be implemented to offer better social protection to families and measured their
actual effect on child labor.2
An interesting exception is Basu (2000) who considers the impact of a minimum wage
legislation on child labor. The minimum wage causes adult unemployment to which parents
may respond by sending more children to work. Hence, this poverty-alleviation policy may
2On the empirical side, there is a growing literature that investigates the impact of social programs and
transfers on child labor (see Edmonds (2008) for a survey). In the case of South Africa, in particular,
Edmonds (2006) shows a significant effect of the pension allowances on child participation in the labor
market.
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end up raising the incidence of child labor.
This paper links two strands of literature: the literature on child labor, and the liter-
ature that addresses the optimality of unemployment insurance programs, in the wake of
Baily (1978), Shavell & Weiss (1979), Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992), Andolfatto & Gomme
(1996),Wang & Williamson (1996), Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997) and Pallage & Zimmer-
mann (2001).
The model we work with is a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents a` la Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992). Adult agents differ in their employment status,
that of their child and the savings they have built up. Parents and children are hit by em-
ployment shocks. They receive job offers randomly according to some Markovian stochastic
process that reflects the labor market dynamics of the economy we want to mimick. Parents
value the household consumption and leisure and dislike child labor. If credit markets are
incomplete, adult agents may use child labor as a way to smooth consumption. The model
also features imperfect monitoring by the government. Hence there may be moral hazard
in the sense that some adults refusing job offers may go undetected and manage to collect
undue unemployment benefits.
We parametrize the model to an economy whose labor market dynamics mimick those of
South Africa in the 1990s. We solve the model numerically and experiment with different
social policies, including a universal basic income such as that discussed by van Parijs (2004)
and Suplicity (2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we build the model. In
Section 2, we describe key characteristics of the South African labor market and parametrize
the model to replicate these. In Section 3 and 4, we present the main results and their
robustness to a series of experiments. In Section 5, we conclude.
1 The Model
We work in a one-good, dynamic world with discrete time and borrowing constraints. There
are two types of agents, adults and children. Each adult has one child. A child in this model
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lives forever as a child.3 There is a continuum of infinitely-lived adults of measure one and
a similar continuum of children.
At each point in time t, an adult a is characterized by two employment shocks sa ∈ {0, 1}
and sc ∈ {0, 1}, respectively for himself and his child: sa (or sc) takes value 1 if the adult
(or the child) has a job offer, it takes value 0 otherwise. Employment opportunities follow a
Markov process with probabilities pa(sat|sa,t−1) and pc(sct|sc,t−1). Employment offers can be
accepted or declined. An agent who works is paid his production.
Let y measure an adult agent’s productivity. It also represents the wage of an adult
worker. A child laborer’s productivity is a fraction λ of an adult’s, λ ∈ [0, 1].
All decisions at the household level are taken by the parent. There is a simple storage tech-
nology, but no access to financial markets. Households are de facto borrowing-constrained.
Hence, parents choose whether they and their child should accept job offers when they have
one, and how much to save from one period to the next. Let mt represent the stock of
savings available at time t. Parents care about the household consumption ct and about a
linear combination of their leisure lat and their child’s lct. These preferences are represented
by a variant of a CES utility function:
u(ct, lat, lct) =
[c1−σt (ηlat + (1− η)lct)σ]1−γ − 1
1− γ (1)
In the above utility function, γ measures the degree of risk aversion of the adult agent,
σ the elasticity of substitution between consumption and the weighted sum of leisure in the
family, and η ∈ [0, 1] is the weight an adult puts on his leisure relative to that of the child.
A measure of altruism is thus given by 1− η. The utility function can be interpreted as the
family’s utility.
Labor is indivisible. If he works, an agent spends a fixed proportion ha or hc of his time
endowment at work.
3Since our focus in this paper is on the trade-off within the household between child labor and savings as
ways to smooth consumption in the context of adverse idiosyncratic shocks, we have adapted the model of
Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) to allow for the possibility to use child labor as a buffer. Our study does not
address intergenerational trade-offs that would require a different modelling with overlapping generations.
In particular, we are not investigating an old-age insurance motive of child labor (Baland & Robinson, 2000;
Bommier & Dubois, 2004).
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Parents face the following budget constraint:
mt+1 + ct = mt + y
d
at + y
d
ct
where ydat and y
d
ct represent the time-t disposable income of an adult and a child respectively.
The objective of a parent is to maximize the expected present-value of infinite streams of
utility, subject to the above budget constraint:
max E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lat, lct)
with β ∈ [0, 1), the adults’ discount factor.
1.1 The economy with unemployment insurance
We consider an unemployment insurance agency whose monitoring of applicants may be
imperfect, which could lead to moral hazard. More precisely, while all agents without job
offers are eligible to unemployment benefits, a fraction pi of agents who refuse offers will be
able to fool the unemployment agency and collect undue benefits. Unemployment benefits are
a fraction θ of the typical wage. The unemployment insurance is financed with a proportional
income tax. The tax rate, τ , is endogenously chosen in such a way that the unemployment
insurance agency balances its budget.
Since child labor is mostly an informal sector phenomenon, we assume that children
neither pay taxes nor receive unemployment benefits.4
Given all the above, an adult agent’s disposable income ydat can be expressed in the
following way:
ydat =

(1− τ)y if he works
(1− τ)θy if he collects UI benefits
0 otherwise
4In some experiments below, we will let unemployed parents also earn an income on the informal labor
market. However, in the case of South Africa, which we use for the parametrization, the adult informal labor
market has been very limited even in the post Apartheid society (Kingdon & Knight, 2004b; Rodrik, 2008).
6
wheras for a child, the disposable income would be:
ydct =
 λy if he works0 otherwise
A typical parent’s problem is recursive and can thus be written as a Bellman equation
(Bellman, 1954), where we drop time subscripts and use prime symbols to denote future
states. In the general case, with an unemployment insurance agency, the value function of a
parent who has a job offer (sa = 1) together with his child (sc = 1) can be written as follows:
V (sa = 1, sc = 1,m) =
max
{
max
m′
[
u((1− τ)y + λy +m−m′, 1− ha, 1− hc) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′)
]
, (both work)
max
m′
[
u((1− τ)y +m−m′, 1− ha, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′)
]
, (only adult works)
(1− pi) max
m′
[
u(λy +m−m′, 1, 1− hc) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′)]
]
+pimax
m′
[
u((1− τ)θy + λy +m−m′, 1, 1− hc) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′)]
]
, (only child works)
(1− pi) max
m′
[
u(m−m′, 1, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′)
]
+pimax
m′
[
u((1− τ)θy +m−m′, 1, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′)
]
(none works)
}
The three other cases are simpler. For example, the value function of a parent without a
job offer (sa = 0), but whose child has one (sc = 1), can be written in the following fashion:
V (sa = 0, sc = 1,m) =
max
{
max
m′
u(m+ (1− τ)θy + λy −m′, 1, 1− hc) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|0)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′) , (child accepts offer)
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max
m′
u(m+ (1− τ)θy −m′, 1, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|0)pc(sc|1)V (sa, sc,m′) (child refuses offer)
}
When the parent has a job offer (sa = 1), while his child does not (sc = 0), the value
function is:
V (sa = 1, sc = 0,m) =
max
{
max
m′
u(m+ (1− τ)y −m′, 1− ha, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|0)V (sa, sc,m′) (adult accepts offer),
(1− pi)u(m−m′, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|0)V (sa, sc,m′)
+piu((1− τ)θy +m−m′, 1, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|1)pc(sc|0)V (sa, sc,m′) (adult refuses offer)
}
Finally, the case where no one has an offer within the household (sa = sc = 0) can be
summarized as:
V (sa = 0, sc = 0,m) =
max
m′
u(m+ (1− τ)θy −m′, 1, 1) +
∑
sa
∑
sc
pa(sa|0)pc(sc|0)V (sa, sc,m′)
1.2 The economy with universal basic income
A universal basic income is given to every adult, whether he works or not. In this case, while
the child’s disposible income remains unchanged, that of the adult becomes:
ydat =
 (1− τubi)(1 + ω)y if he works(1− τubi)ωy if he does not work, whether by choice or not
where ω is the basic income as a proportion of a worker’s wage. It compares directly to the
replacement ratio θ in the case of the unemployment insurance program.
As for the unemployment insurance program, we impose that the universal basic income
agency balances its budget. The tax τubi levied on all income finances the program. Bellman
equations can be written in a similar fashion.
8
1.3 The economy with a ban on child labor
A ban on child labor forces the productivity of the child to be zero. Here, it boils down
to imposing λ = 0. We will measure the welfare effects of this ban. Furthermore, adult
disposable income is simply:
ydat =
 y if he works0 otherwise
1.4 Solution technique and equilibrium definition
Bellman equations of the type we have in our model do not admit closed-form solutions.
We will therefore parametrize the model and revert to numerical solutions. We use stan-
dard dynamic programming techniques to extract equilibrium outcomes. The state space is
discretized and the Bellman equations are solved numerically for each individual category,
given a policy vector.
This is done by iterations on the value function (Stokey & Lucas, 1989) for every parent,
applying Banach fixed point theorem. The agents’ optimal decisions are then extracted and
the corresponding stationary distribution of agents is computed. In each scenario (unem-
ployment insurance, universal basic income or ban), the stationary distribution of agents
f ∗(sa, sc,m) is found by iterations using the optimal decision rules of parents obtained from
their respective Bellman equation. The distribution is stationary at iteration j, if we have:
f ∗j+1(sa, sc,m) = f
∗
j (sa, sc,m) ∀sa, sc,m
Clearly, population accounting implies that f ∗ also satisfies:
∑
sa
∑
sc
∑
m
f ∗(sa, sc,m) = 1
If the social program does not balance its budget for the resulting stationary distribution,
we adjust the tax rate and start the value function iteration again for the new policy vector.
The procedure is stopped when the agency’s budget is balanced. We compare steady states
of our economy under various policies.
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A steady state equilibrium, in this economy, is therefore a choice of adult and child leisure,
household consumption and savings, for every parent at every state of the world (sa, sc,m), a
distribution of households f ∗, and, when applicable, a policy vector (either [τ, θ] or [τubi, ω]),
such that all parents’ decisions maximize their Bellman equation given the policy vector, the
distribution of agents is stationary, and the social agency balances its budget.
2 Parametrization
We parametrize the model to South Africa in the 1990s, after the end of Apartheid and prior
to the introduction of a generalized public unemployment insurance program.
2.1 Child labor in South Africa
In 1999, Statistics South Africa, together with the International Labor organization (ILO),
conducted the first national survey of child labor [the Survey of Activities of Young People
(SAYP)].
The aggregate statistics suggest a very large incidence of child labor: According to the
SAYP (1999) and CLAP (2003), in 1999, 45% of children were engaged in some form of child
labor. These statistics are computed for children 5-17 and for a minimum of one hour of work
per week. About 15.5% of children in this age group were working more than twelve hours
a week. If we limit ourselves to children 5-14, as is more common in child labor studies, the
incidence of child labor is 6.8% for the three-hour minimum, and to 2.5% for twelve hours
or more.
Since 1997, child labor in South Africa is prohibited by law (Basic Conditions of Employ-
ment Act of 1997). While the ban was obviously not completely effective in 1999, it is likely
that child labor observed in the 1999 survey is already tainted by its implementation. In
2000, South Africa ratified both ILO Conventions C138 (Minimum Age for Employment)
and C182 (Worst Forms of Child Labor). In this paper, we question the use of a ban. We
will investigate alternative ways to fight child labor.
Different social policies have been implemented in South Africa since the end of the
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Apartheid, to reduce poverty, like the Old Age Grant (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Miller,
2003; Edmonds, 2006), the Child Support Grant and the Foster Care Grant – in particular
for children in households affected by HIV/AIDS. The Child Support Grant is emphasized in
the Child Labour Action Programme (CLAP, 2003). It provides a small conditionnal grant
(at R 240 a month in 2009) for children between 6 and 15, in order to reduce poverty and the
number of children engaged in work activities. In 2001, an unemployment insurance system
was also established (South African Department of Labour, 2001).
2.2 Parametrizing the model
The job market in South Africa, in the 1990s, is characterized by high unemployment, a
relatively small informal sector, and high unemployment duration.
We set the length of a period to six weeks, as is typical in models of the kind (Hansen &
I˙mrohorog˘lu, 1992; Pallage & Zimmermann, 2001) and set the discount factor β to 0.9944.
This implies a 5% annual real interest rate, which is consistent with the real interest rate in
South Africa in much of the 1990s, early 2000 (World Bank, 2010).
The South African unemployment rate we consider is 23.3%, while the average duration
of unemployment we select is about two years, i.e. 17.33 model periods (Kingdon & Knight,
2004a, 2004b, 2007). In fact, Kingdon & Knight (2004b) computed from the October House-
hold Survey 1997 (OHS 97) that 37% of the unemployed experienced an unemployment
duration superior to 3 years, 29% had an unemployment spell between 1 and 3 years. Table
1 provides the relevant statistics.
Table 1: South African adult labor market statistics
Adult unemployment duration (1997) Unempl rate (narrow def) Unempl rate (broad def)
2.2 years 23.3% [OHS 1999] 36.2% [OHS 1999]
28.2% [LFS 2003] 41.8% [LSF 2003]
Source : Kingdon & Knight (2004b), October Household Survey 1999 (OHS 1999), and Labour Force Survey 2003 (LFS 2003).
As can be seen from Table 1, our choice of an unemployment rate of 23.3% for 1999 is
in fact quite conservative. The narrow definition excludes the unemployed who wanted to
work but did not search actively in the reference period, contrary to the broad definition that
includes this group. Interestingly, some empirical work shows that a very small proportion of
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the unemployed go to the informal sector in South Africa, contrary to developing countries
standards (Kingdon & Knight, 2004b; Magruber, 2010). Kingdon & Knight (2004b) also
show that this lack of search in South Africa is mainly due to discouragement and constraints
driven by poverty rather than due to a weaker desire to get into the labor market, and that
both narrow and broad definitions of unemployment are relevant.
We do not have data on “child unemployment” since such statistics are not recorded.
We thus consider two possibilities for children’s idiosyncratic shocks. In a first series of
experiments, we assume that children always have a job opportunity. Since child labor is an
informal sector phenomenon, we consider that children’s labor market is more flexible (lower
unemployment rate and smaller unemployment spells). We will later on report a case in
which children face the same labor market risk as their parents (case of symmetric shocks).
Transition probabilities for adult employment shocks are computed using the adult un-
employment rate and unemployment duration in the following way. First, the probability
to exit unemployment, p(1|0), is given by the inverse of the unemployment duration, i.e.
p(1|0) = 1/17.33 = 0.0577. To obtain p(0|1), we use Bayes laws and the fact that the unem-
ployment rate, pu, needs to satisfy the following equation: pu = p(0|1)(1−pu)+(1−p(1|0))pu.
Table 2 gives the resulting transition probabilities.
Table 2: Transition probabilities
p(1|1) p(0|1) p(1|0) p(0|0)
0.9825 0.0175 0.0577 0.9423
We do not have estimates of the elasticity of substitution σ and risk aversion γ for South
Africa. We set these parameters to the closest equivalent in the United States [γ = 2.5
and σ = 0.67 as in Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992)]. We therefore assume that households
in South Africa and the United States, although they face very different labor market risks,
have similar preferences. We think this assumption is reasonable, in absence of any indication
otherwise.
We normalize adult production y to 1. This will allow us to interpret quantitative results
in terms of GDP per capita.
Some parameters remain unknown. We will therefore consider a range of values for the
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child/adult productivity ratio, λ, and for the weight of adult leisure in the utility function,
η.5
We focus on child labor that is equivalent to full-time work. We consider that an adult
works for 45% of his available time. Hence children when they work spend an equivalent
time away from leisure: hc = ha = 0.45.
3 Results
We want to identify the socially optimal UI policy and compare its effects to a ban on child
labor and a universal basic income. We do so in an economy that experiences idiosyncratic
shocks similar to those of South Africa. Table 3 summarizes the results under different
scenarios.
As can be seen quite rapidly, Table 3 has a lot of important implications. First, it
suggests that regardless of the altruism/child productivity parameters, bans on child labor
in such environment always do worse in terms of average welfare than the other policies
considered. Second, it also suggests that the optimal unemployment insurance policy always
dominates the other policies, even under intense moral hazard (pi = 1). Third, it shows
that a universal basic income may sometimes be a reasonable alternative to unemployment
insurance, especially since it may be easier to manage.6 Fourth, unemployment insurance
and universal basic income policies can endogenously lead to the elimination of child labor if
altruism, 1− η, is at least moderate, and child productivity, λ, is not too large, with respect
to adult productivity. Fifth, although results may be quantitatively different depending on
5In the case of λ, i.e. the contribution of the child to the household income, unfortunately little data is
available on child wages. In South Africa, much of child labor takes place in family businesses (SAYP, 1999),
or is illegal. For Botswana, however, Mueller (1984) shows that all children and young adults (aged 7 to 19)
account for 42 percent of all income earning time. Levison, Anker, Ashraf, & Barge (1998) estimate that
in India’s carpet industry, children are 21 percent less productive in hand-knitting than adults. Moehling
(2005) shows that in early twentieth century United States, earnings from child labor account for 23% of
the child laborer’s family income, which translates in our model to a λ-value of 30%. We experiment in the
paper with a range of reasonable values.
6The cost of managing the program – not incorporated in the model – may indeed make the basic income
policy more appealing than the unemployment insurance, for which monitoring applicants is important.
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the scenario, the qualitative conclusion that unemployment insurance is socially desirable
and better than a child labor ban, is very robust.
Table 4 illustrates the response of steady state child labor and savings to the increase
in unemployment insurance compensation in the case of moderate child contribution and
moderate altruism (λ = η = 0.5), a case we consider reasonable and conservative. It appears
that child labor disappears for replacement rates, θ, well below the optimum. Precautionary
savings also drop rapidly, from more than 10 times the average periodic income to zero when
θ is optimal. Table 4 also shows that there are important welfare gains associated with
the introduction of the optimal unemployment insurance package. The idiosyncratic shocks
are so strong that agents need to self insure by accumulating costly buffers or reluctantly
resorting to child labor. The unemployment insurance program relieves them from either
form of self-insurance.
Although child labor decreases monotonically in this table, there may be several opposite
effects at play as we increase θ. First, unemployed adults tend to reduce child labor as
the need to self-insure becomes smaller. Second, because being more generous towards the
unemployed implies a higher tax rate, some adult workers may resort to child labor to make
up for the lost income if their assets are low. Eventually, as generosity becomes very large,
it may be that the tax burden induces adults to quit working and substitute child labor for
adult labor. In Table 4, the first effect dominates the second and the third does not take
place. In some experiments , however, we may lose the monotonicity of the response of child
labor to higher social generosity (e.g. Table 6).
Interestingly, moral hazard is not as important in this context as previously reported
(Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu, 1992; Wang & Williamson, 1996). It takes a success rate of shirkers,
pi, above 0.5, to observe significant quitting behaviors.7 This is due to the fact that parents
do not value leisure as strongly in this model as in others. They value a weighted average
of their leisure and their child’s. If we remove altruism and let η go to 1, we find the type
of results emphasized in the literature. Altruism is important at turning off moral hazard.
Indeed, if pi < 1, parents know that by refusing job offers, they increase the likelyhood that
they will have to use child labor to earn a positive income. As long as there is a disutility from
7In fact, even for cases in which pi = 1, it takes rather large replacement rates, θ, in this model to induce
unsustainable quitting behaviors.
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child labor, they are much less likely to refuse offers than in a purely selfish environment.
Hence moral hazard matters much less.
In Table 5, similar effects are reported for the universal basic income in the same reason-
able scenario. One should note, however, that it takes higher social generosity than with
unemployment insurance for child labor to vanish at the steady state. Savings also tend
to stay at higher levels. In effect, the net income from UBI is rather low, given the very
large tax rates that are required to sustain the program. When ω becomes very large, adult
workers decide to quit, the system of universal basic income collapses (tax rate of 100%)
and child labor re-emerges massively as it becomes the only way to earn a positive income.
Clearly, such scenario is socially very costly. The drop in average utility when ω goes beyond
the optimum (ω? = 0.70) is quite dramatic.8
It should be noticed that, although suboptimal, the levels of UI generosity θ or UBI ω
sufficient to eliminate child labor both procure an average level of welfare that is higher than
under a child labor ban. These levels of generosity are likely somewhat higher than those
currently in place in South Africa. The Unemployment Insurance Act, introduced in 2001,
and amended in 2008 offers a maximum Income Replacement Rate (IRR), of between 38%
and 60% for a maximum of 34 weeks.9
The limits of social policies to address child labor – Social policies, we have shown, can
do much to alleviate the effects of idiosyncratic employment shocks. In many plausible
instances, they may provide enough consumption smoothing to those hit by the shocks so
that they no longer need to resort to child labor. There are limits to this effect, however. In
situations in which parents care significantly more about their own leisure than that of their
child (cases of relative selfishness with η → 1) or in situations in which children bring home
an income almost as large as their parents (λ→ 1), it is not possible to eliminate child labor
with the proper design of an unemployment insurance or a universal basic income. The case
8It is interesting to notice that when ω = 0.5 in Table 5, the universal basic income acts as would another
policy sometimes used to fight child labor: a conditional grant. At this level of generosity, the transfer is
sufficient for all parents to abandon child labor.
9Pallage, Scruggs, & Zimmermann (2009) show that the mapping between observed unemployment in-
surance replacement ratios and those in models similar to ours is not straightforward. The socially optimal
θ? reported in Table 4, for example, suggests an unemployment insurance generosity substantially higher
than that in place in South Africa, since the latter has time limits to benefits.
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of a large λ was already illustrated in Table 3 (Scenario 5). We show in Table 6 the case of
a relatively high η. As can be seen from the table, an increase in UI generosity reduces child
labor up to a certain point as less self-insurance is needed. Savings also drop simultaneously.
Yet as the tax burden to sustain the unemployment insurance program becomes large, more
and more adults choose to refuse offers, and voluntary adult unemployment thus increases,
putting even more pressure on those who stay on the job to finance the unemployment
insurance program. Quitters sustitute tax-immune child labor to the heavily taxed adult
labor. Hence the non-monotonicity of child labor’s response to higher replacement ratios, θ.
The quitting behavior makes it impossible to sustain an unemployment insurance policy as
generous as that in the base scenario (Table 4). At the socially optimal level of generosity
(θ? = 0.60), child labor is not eliminated. Still, the optimal social policy dominates the ban
in terms of average welfare.
4 Discussion and other experiments
Pure self-insurance – Does doing nothing also dominate the child labor ban? Although
Table 3 suggests that such may be the case, we should be very careful in drawing this
conclusion. Absent from the model is education and the effects it should have on future
welfare. While education would have the same effect on all policies that eliminate child
labor (ban, UI, UBI) and thus would not change the conclusions reached above, it would
change the comparison between the social welfare resulting from the ban and that resulting
from the status quo. Another model with overlapping generations would thus be required
to investigate this particular question.
A policy mix – What if we combine a UI or UBI policy with a child labor ban? Most
recent efforts to eliminate child labor typically feature a ban with accompanying policies
(see, for instance, ILO Convention 138). A priori, at levels of generosity θ or ω for which
child labor endogenously vanishes, the constraint imposed by the ban will not be binding,
making the ban a redundant policy. For low levels of generosity in which child labor would be
optimally chosen by families, the ban removes one important insurance mechanism against
idiosyncratic shocks, with adverse welfare effects. Italicized numbers in Table 7 confirm this
intuition for the case of moderate altruism. However, in the case of universal basic income,
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another effect is at play. Without the ban, adult workers tend to quit in large numbers when
benefits ω become too large, which makes the UBI policy unsustainable at the steady state.
The ban makes such quitting behavior very costly since one can no longer rely on child labor
to bring home a labor income. Hence, the ban may in fact be a desirable policy for large
levels of ω, as bold numbers in Table 7 suggest. Such policy combination, however remains
dominated by the optimal UI package identified in Table 3.
Using the broad definition of unemployment – Kingdon & Knight (2004b) show that the
measure of unemployment in South Africa may be substantially higher than the one we
use if one accounts for agents who want work but no longer actively search because they
have been discouraged by past experiences. Correcting for those, in 1999 would have meant
an unemployment rate of 36.2% (see Table 1). We have reparameterized our economy to
account for this possibility. Table 8 presents the steady-state results for the base scenario
with moderate altruism and moderate child contribution. As can be expected when we
increase the amplitude of idiosyncratic shocks adult agents tend to revert more frequently
to child labor. Banning the latter in such case is of course all the more costly to families.
Although, riskiness has almost doubled compared to that in Table 4, average assets have
hardly increased. Parents respond to the increased riskiness by almost doubling the number
of child laborers at the steady state.
Symmetric shocks – We have assumed so far that children always find work if they want
to. We relax this assumption in an experiment in which children face the same employment
risk on the informal labor market as their parents on the formal labor market. Both face an
unemployment rate of 23.3% and an average unemployment duration of 2 years. We report
the results for the unemployment insurance policy and a possible child labor ban in Table 9.
This change in child labor riskiness makes child labor a less efficient insurance mechanism.
Hence, when we compare the results to those in Table 4, we see that parents on average rely
less on their child’s labor at the steady state and slightly increase their asset holdings when
they would otherwise have chosen more child labor. The child labor ban is nevertheless a
dominated policy.
A parameterization to the United States – In another experiment, we investigate what
agents would have done if the risks they faced were similar to those experienced by U.S.
workers in the same 1990s. We assume an adult unemployment rate of 6% and an average
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unemployment spell of 12 weeks, as in Hansen & I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and Pallage & Zim-
mermann (2001). Table 10 contains the results of this experiment. As can be seen from
the table, with such levels of risk, child labor would hardly be used as a way to smooth out
consumption fluctuations. Asset build-up is moderate when compared to that in Table 4,
given the low risk of unemployment and the short unemployment spell. Average welfare is
clearly strongly better.
An experiment with home production, i.e. productive adult leisure – Finally, we introduce
the possibility that unemployed adults may have access to a home production technology.
While the informal sector is not important in South Africa (Magruber, 2010), it can be very
significant in some developing countries. We proxy this possibility of earning a non-taxable
income while being unemployed by this home production technology. In our experiments,
we allow unemployed parents to earn an income representing 10% of the income they would
have received as formal sector workers. Their leisure is simultaneously reduced by the same
proportion. Table 11 shows that the ranking of policies remains unchanged by this possibility,
the optimal unemployment insurance policy dominating both the universal basic income
policy and the ban, even under substantial moral hazard. In the self-insurance scenario,
child labor has clearly dropped compared to the equivalent number in the first part of Table
3. The home production technology makes families less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks.
Hence they rely less on child labor. In fact, if we let the income from home production rise
above 30%, child labor is no longer used, even in absence of unemployment insurance.
Alternative utility function – Our results are fairly robust to an alternative utility function.
We experiment with a linear combination of a CES utility function for the adult and for the
child:
u(ct, lat, lct) = µ
[(νct)
1−σlσat]
1−γ − 1
1− γ + (1− µ)
[{(1− ν)ct}1−σlσct]1−γ − 1
1− γ (2)
with ν the share of family consumption devoted to the adult and µ the weight of adult
utility in the household, with a similar interpretation as η in the previous formulation. We
take the same values for σ and γ. Although results may differ quantitatively, the conclusion
that unemployment insurance dominates all other policies, including the ban, is robust to this
new utility function for all values of µ and ν. In a scenario very close to the one we consider
reasonable with the original utility function (moderate child contribution and moderate
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altruism) and with children consuming 30% of family consumption, Table 12 suggests a
socially optimal unemployment replacement ratio of 0.80, similar to that identified in Table
4. That policy brings an average welfare substantially larger than that under the ban. Child
labor endogenously vanishes with the optimal UI.
5 Conclusion
Labor market risks in some countries can be very important and have strong adverse welfare
effects. If those subject to employment shocks face borrowing constraints, they will try to
self-insure using any possible means. Savings are one way to do this. Sending children to
work is another.
In this paper, we show that child labor can endogenously arise as a response to idiosyn-
cratic shocks to adult employment. In this context, a ban on child labor deprives households
of an important way to help smooth consumption. Social policies such as an unemployment
insurance program that directly addresses the cause of child labor, can induce large welfare
gains and remove the need to resort to child labor as a way to help smooth a family’s con-
sumption. We show, that in cases of moderate altruism and moderate child laborer’s income,
the unemployment insurance program and the universal basic income policy can make child
labor vanish, and are socially more desirable than a child labor ban.
The paper brings new insight on the link between child labor and social policy and provides
a framework to theoretically investigate the response of child labor to idiosyncratic shocks.
Our approach puts emphasis on theory and measurement. We quantify the effects shocks
may have on child labor, the effects a child labor ban may have on welfare and individual
choices, and the generosity of social programs needed to alleviate the effects of the shocks.
We can therefore perform a wide variety of experiments and compare the desirability of
alternative social responses to child labor. Our results show that social policies should be
viewed as credible ways to address child labor.
Other paths could be explored. In particular, easing parents’ borrowing constraints by
allowing for some micro-credit may be an interesting competitor to the policies we investigate.
Accounting for the effect of aggregate shocks could represent another interesting path.
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There are no easy remedy to child labor. Except in some cases well highlighted in the
literature, bans are typically not the solution. Solutions should address the causes of the phe-
nomenon, which can be difficult to identify. If the causes, as in this paper, are idiosyncratic
shocks, a ban alone will act as a rhinoceros trying to pick a poppy. It will not address the
shocks. It will only make them more severe for those who experience them. Social policies,
in particular an unemployment insurance system, could do substantially better.
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Table 3: A comparison of policies
Scenario 1: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
θ or ω Tax rate Assets Child labor Average welfare
Child labor ban n-a n-a 20.9671 0 -55.5536
Optimal UI (pi ≤ 0.5) 0.80 0.1955 0 0 -46.8337
Optimal UI (pi = 1) 0.50 0.1319 1.0600 0 -48.4269
Optimal UBI 0.70 0.4772 2.2024 0 -49.1948
Pure self-insurance n-a n-a 10.8270 0.0577 -54.0330
Scenario 2: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and large altruism η = 0.3
θ or ω Tax rate Assets Child labor Average welfare
Child labor ban n-a n-a 22.3079 0 -41.4492
Optimal UI (pi ≤ 0.5) 0.90 0.2147 0 0 -32.9512
Optimal UI (pi = 1) 0.70 0.1754 0.0726 0 -33.5319
Optimal UBI 0.70 0.4772 2.8442 0 -35.5155
Pure self-insurance n-a n-a 12.2364 0.0518 -40.1023
Scenario 3: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and small altruism η = 0.6
θ or ω Tax rate Assets Child labor Average welfare
Child labor ban n-a n-a 20.2685 0 -63.8578
Optimal UI (pi ≤ 0.5) 0.80 0.1955 0 0 -54.9743
Optimal UI (pi = 1) 0.40 0.1083 2.1022 0 -57.3479
Optimal UBI 0.30 0.2812 5.4214 0 -59.0868
Pure self-insurance n-a n-a 10.4963 0.0942 -61.8096
Scenario 4: small child contribution λ = 0.25 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
θ or ω Tax rate Assets Child labor Average welfare
Child labor ban n-a n-a 20.9671 0 -55.5536
Optimal UI (pi ≤ 0.5) 0.80 0.1955 0 0 -46.8337
Optimal UI (pi = 1) 0.50 0.1319 1.0600 0 -48.4269
Optimal UBI 1 0.5659 1.0600 0 -48.4269
Pure self-insurance n-a n-a 15.7249 0.0181 -54.9596
Scenario 5: large child contribution λ = 0.8 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
θ or ω Tax rate Assets Child labor Average welfare
Child labor ban n-a n-a 20.9671 0 -55.5536
Optimal UI (pi ≤ 0.5) 0.80 0.1955 0.2510 0.3194 -44.3377
Optimal UI (pi = 1) 0.40 0.1083 3.7314 0.2904 -46.3595
Optimal UBI 0.10 0.1153 7.1251 0.2901 -48.3874
Pure self-insurance n-a n-a 7.7758 0.2835 -49.1865
Note: In the table, average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady
state corresponding to the given policy. The optimal UI under given moral hazard pi or optimal UBI represent
the level of generosity (θ or ω) that maximizes average welfare in the scenario considered. The tax rate
presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium
households’ decisions.
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Table 4: Unemployment insurance and child labor
Scenario 1: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
UI (pi ≤ 0.5) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 10.8270 0 0.0577 -54.0330
0.10 0.0295 8.5719 0 0.0381 -52.7190
0.20 0.0573 6.3660 0 0.0277 -51.4907
0.30 0.0835 4.3673 0 0.0106 -50.3493
0.40 0.1083 2.3871 0 0 -49.3103
0.50 0.1319 1.0600 0 0 -48.4269
0.60 0.1542 0.2784 0 0 -47.7133
0.70 0.1754 0 0 0 -47.1432
0.80? 0.1955 0 0 0 -46.8337
0.90 0.2147 0 0 0 -46.8508
1 0.2330 0.1115 0 0 -47.0155
Note: In the table, average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady state
corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. The
socially optimal replacement ratio is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’
decisions.
Table 5: Universal basic income and child labor
Scenario 1: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
UBI ω Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 10.8270 0 0.0577 -54.0330
0.10 0.1153 8.7799 0 0.0429 -52.8332
0.20 0.2068 7.0649 0 0.0282 -51.8890
0.30 0.2812 5.7425 0 0.0186 -51.1273
0.40 0.3428 4.6447 0 0.0134 -50.5076
0.50 0.3946 3.6551 0 0 -49.9964
0.60 0.4389 2.8287 0 0 -49.5544
0.70? 0.4772 2.2024 0 0 -49.1948
0.80 1 0.3570 0.7670 0.9832 -118.0049
Note: In the table, average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the
steady state corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the
chosen policy. The socially optimal UBI is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium
households’ decisions.
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Table 6: Low altruism and unemployment insurance
Moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and low altruism η = 0.65
UI (pi = 0.5) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 10.9188 0 0.1738 -65.2814
0.10 0.0295 8.6348 0 0.1480 -64.1466
0.20 0.0573 6.4177 0 0.1313 -63.0908
0.30 0.0835 4.4051 0 0.1053 -62.1258
0.40 0.1083 2.4573 0 0.0984 -61.2297
0.50 0.1319 1.1469 0 0.1113 -60.4428
0.60? 0.1542 0.3529 0 0.1315 -59.7799
0.70 0.3460 0.3796 0.2761 0.4909 -73.4098
Child labor ban
n-a n-a 19.9111 0 0 -68.3925
Note: In the table, average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady state
corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. The socially
optimal replacement ratio is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’ decisions.
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Table 7: Combining policies
Scenario 1: moderate altruism η = 0.5
Ban with UI (pi ≤ 0.5) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 20.9671 0 0 -55.5536
0.10 0.0295 11.8293 0 0 -53.2734
0.20 0.0573 7.3935 0 0 -51.6734
0.30 0.0835 4.4206 0 0 -50.3754
0.40 0.1083 2.3871 0 0 -49.3103
0.50 0.1319 1.0600 0 0 -48.4269
0.60 0.1542 0.2784 0 0 -47.7133
0.70 0.1754 0 0 0 -47.1432
0.80? 0.1955 0 0 0 -46.8337
0.90 0.2147 0 0 0 -46.8508
1 0.2330 0.1115 0 0 -47.0155
Scenario 1: moderate altruism η = 0.5
Ban with UBI ω Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 20.9671 0 0 -55.5536
0.10 0.1153 12.3426 0 0 -53.4375
0.20 0.2068 8.6690 0 0 -52.1680
0.30 0.2812 6.3556 0 0 -51.2461
0.40 0.3428 4.7778 0 0 -50.5466
0.50 0.3946 3.6551 0 0 -49.9964
0.60 0.4389 2.8287 0 0 -49.5544
0.70 0.4772 2.2024 0 0 -49.1948
0.80 0.5105 1.7254 0 0 -48.8940
0.90 0.5399 1.3532 0 0 -48.6415
1? 0.5659 1.0600 0 0 -48.4269
Note: We combine the ban with an unemployment insurance or a universal basic income. Lines in italic mean the ban is welfare
decreasing compared to the alternative scenario without the ban, lines in bold characters mean the ban is welfare improving. It is
redundant otherwise. Average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady state corresponding
to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. The socially optimal replacement
ratio or UBI is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’ decisions.
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Table 8: Broad definition of unemployment
Scenario 1: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
UI (pi ≤ 0.5) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 11.3896 0 0.1025 -65.2176
0.10 0.0537 8.8539 0 0.0765 -63.6117
0.20 0.1019 6.5320 0 0.0507 -62.1709
0.30 0.1455 4.5688 0 0.0249 -60.8797
0.40 0.1850 2.7145 0 0 -59.7216
0.50 0.2210 1.3684 0 0 -58.7117
0.60 0.2540 0.5239 0 0 -57.9295
0.70? 0.2843 0.0831 0 0 -57.3474
0.80 0.3122 0 0 0 -56.9762
0.90 0.3380 0 0 0 -57.0004
Child labor ban
n-a n-a 16.3581 0 0 -68.1358
Note: In this experiment, adults are faced with substantially larger labor market risk (unemployment rate of 36.2%, but
same duration of unemployment). Average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the
steady state corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy.
The socially optimal replacement ratio is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’
decisions.
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Table 9: Symmetric risks
Scenario 1: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
UI (pi = 0) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 15.2719 0 0.0343 -54.5613
0.10 0.0295 9.6318 0 0.0254 -52.9314
0.20 0.0573 6.6380 0 0.0194 -51.5442
0.30 0.0835 4.3773 0 0.0083 -50.3553
0.40 0.1083 2.3871 0 0 -49.3103
0.50 0.1319 1.0600 0 0 -48.4269
0.60 0.1542 0.2784 0 0 -47.7133
0.70 0.1754 0 0 0 -47.1432
0.80? 0.1955 0 0 0 -46.8337
0.90 0.2147 0 0 0 -46.8508
1 0.2330 0.1115 0 0 -47.0155
Child labor ban
n-a n-a 20.9671 0 0 -55.5536
Note: In this experiment, children face the same labor market risks as adults (unemployment rate of 23% and duration of
unemployment of 2 years. Average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady
state corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy.
The socially optimal replacement ratio is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’
decisions.
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Table 10: U.S.-like labor market risks
Scenario 1: moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
UI (pi ≤ 0.5) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 2.6244 0 0.0030 -42.5083
0.10 0.0063 2.1781 0 0.0027 -42.3949
0.20 0.0126 1.7328 0 0.0014 -42.2936
0.30 0.0188 1.2356 0 0 -42.1920
0.40 0.0249 0.8102 0 0 -42.0949
0.50 0.0309 0.4700 0 0 -42.0072
0.60 0.0369 0.2192 0 0 -41.9252
0.70 0.0428 0.0521 0 0 -41.8535
0.80 0.0486 0 0 0 -41.7919
0.90? 0.0543 0.0065 0 0 -41.7883
1 0.0603 0.0349 0 0 -41.8329
Child labor ban
n-a n-a 3.5857 0 0 -42.5219
Note: Labor market dynamics in this experiment replicate the US unemployment rate of 6% and average duration of
unemployment of 12 weeks in the 1990s. Average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at
the steady state corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy.
The socially optimal replacement ratio is identified with a ?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’
decisions.
Table 11: An experiment with home production (10% of labor income)
Moderate child contribution λ = 0.5 and moderate altruism η = 0.5
θ or ω Tax rate Assets Child labor Average welfare
Child labor ban n-a n-a 12.7042 0 -52.8077
Optimal UI (pi ≤ 0.5) 0.80 0.1955 0 0 -46.1525
Optimal UI (pi = 1) 0.50 0.1319 0.3329 0 -47.0726
Optimal UBI 0.80 0.5105 0.7351 0 -47.4616
Self-insurance n-a n-a 10.2044 0.0290 -52.4054
Note: In this experiment, unemployed adults devote 10% of their leisure producing a home good, worth 1/10 of
a worker’s income. Average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady
state corresponding to the given policy. The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy.
All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’ decisions.
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Table 12: Alternative utility function
moderate child contribution λ = 0.5, moderate altruism µ = 0.5, share of adult consumption ν = 0.7
UI (pi ≤ 0.5) θ Tax rate Assets Vol. unempl. Child labor Average welfare
0 0 5.2552 0 0.1501 -143.5477
0.10 0.0295 3.5249 0 0.1499 -142.0279
0.20 0.0573 2.4168 0 0.1520 -140.8076
0.30 0.0835 1.7753 0 0.1180 -139.8131
0.40 0.1083 1.1612 0 0.0810 -138.8202
0.50 0.1319 0.6940 0 0.0550 -137.8816
0.60 0.1542 0.2218 0 0 -136.9962
0.70 0.1754 0 0 0 -136.1404
0.80? 0.1955 0 0 0 -135.7396
0.90 0.2147 0.0047 0 0 -135.8248
Child labor ban
n-a n-a 16.3228 0 0 -154.6725
Note: In this experiment, we use a weighted sum of CES utility functions for the adult and the child within the household [Eq. (2)].
Average welfare is computed as the weighted sum of households’ value function at the steady state corresponding to the given policy.
The tax rate presented guarantees a balanced budget for the chosen policy. The socially optimal replacement ratio is identified with a
?. All statistics are aggregated from equilibrium households’ decisions.
30
